4^ 






ft 




Glass 
Book. 






VIEWS 



( ) N T II E W A R , 



THK 



ADMINISTRATION AND T H P^ PEOPLE, 

WITH SPECIAL REMARKS ON 

McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN. 



BY A SOLDIER, 

T H R K 1-: ^■ E A 1{ S 1 N T 11 I-: A MMY O F T HI-: I* ( ) TOM A C , 



18 64. 



INTRODUCTION 



Since writing the following " Views," a convention of all the " outs " 
who have an " itching palm " to be the " ins,'' has assembled at Chicago 
and nominated George B. McCiellan for i'rusident. I liad no expcclaiion 
of seeing this done, notwithstanding allusion is made to it in the tollowing 
pages, as his promised reward for conducting the war, during llic lime lie 
■was Commander-in-Chief of our armies, in such a way as to piolong it 
until the present time ; and I can only account for the fact that the De- 
mocracy have kept their promise, on the hypothesis that they ibund him 
willing to do their bidding so completely, and tluit lie is made of such 
plastic material as to lead them to hope that he, aliovu all other men, 
would become as clay in the hands of the cunning Seymours and ricrces. 

It is with no expectation of converting a single •' Peace -' or " Copper- 
head " Democrat, that the "Views" are presented in a printed tmin ; 
these men are beyond hope, their mottoes being '' Crusli Lincoln,"- "Kuie 
or Ruin." The " Views " were written for the purpose of pointing out 
some of the causes why the war is not bronglit to a close, and are de- 
signed for circulation amongst that class who desire to see a restoration of 
the Union, honorable to the North, yet from adverse influences brought to 
bear upon them, do not lend that hearty support to the Government that 
they ought. They are further designed to bring to mind tacts in connection 
with the Peninsular and first Alarylaiid Campaigns, that the soldiers who 
were engaged in them can weigh for themselves, that they may the better 
determine how to exercise their privilege in the coming election. 

If the opinions expressed of McC'lellan are in some measure severe, 
they are honest and fully believed by the writer. It is no party feeling 
that has prompted them, for I confess myself as one of tiiose wlio do not 
believe that wisdom has always dwelt with our rulers; but wliilclsay 
this, I do believe that we have in the person of Abraham Lincoln an 
able statesman and an honest man, and these, in my estimation, outweigh 
all other claims, and should secure his re-election. 

W. J. H. 



VIEWS ON THE WAR. 



The writer will not attempt in the following pages to discuss at length the 
causes which led to the present unhappy Rebellion, but will endeavor, as best 
he can, to combat the position taken by some, that the war and its prolon- 
gation is mainly chargeable to the present Administration. It will be re- 
membered that the war was inauo-urated under a Democratic rule ; nay, 
fostered and encouraged even to this day by those claiming to be Democrats, 
but who desire at heart the success of the South, asserting that the contest 
is waged simply for the purpose of overthrowing Slavery, and that the South 
desires peace — while the leaders of the Rebellion are forcing every man 
capable of bearing arms into the rebel army, and spurning every proposition 
which copperhead sycophants can conjure up that contains even the word 
" peace" or its synonj^ra. 

No one knows better than these same advocates for " peace on any terms " 
that the authority of the Government will be again established over all the 
seceded States ; and it is only the vain hope of securing again a "united 
South " after reconstruction, to carry them with the help of the North once 
more into power, that causes sympathizers with treason here at home to bend 
the suppliant knee to those who are trying to break up the Government, and 
to destroy all the safeguards of civil liberty. Without this programme their 
" occupation is gone." 

That the war was inaugurated in the interest of, and was caused by Slav- 
ery, few amongst these same " peace " men are found with assuranc eenough 
to deny. Our glorious country, spreading herself like an ^gis over the' 
North-west, thereby opening new avenues for the down-trodden of Europe, 
and the enterprise and thrift of our New England and Middle States, ( poor 
material, I own, out of which to make slave states,) led the South to see 
that the balance of power would soon be against them. This it was that 
caused them to strike the blow designed to break the connection with those 
who could not see, in the institution of Slavery, the Golden Calf to fall 
down and worship. But in th.'it blow I see the hand of an all-wise Prov- 
idence, for the very act done to give a new lease of life to the institution of 
Slavery will, I believe, in God's own good time, prove to be a dagger driven 
surely to its heart. And thus it is that " He makes the wrath of man to 
praise Him." 

That the people Norlh and South never anticipated that the war would 
be so severe is patent, I think, to all. The South, believing Cotton to be 
King, "laid the flattering unction to its soul " that sixty days would secure 



( '^ ) 

the recognition of Europe. The North, equally in error, conckuled thnt the 
South when tully tested would not secede. The South did secede, and "Cot- 
ton was not King." 

The war being inaugurated under the "imbecile " Administration of Pres- 
ident Buchanan, the people awaited with anxiety yet with confidence, for 
the incoming Administration, when Abraham Lincoln would take his seat as 
President, and assume the reins of Government. The day arrived, and soon 
the President issued his proclamation for 7r),000 men. Now the country 
breathed freer. The merchant went to his traffic and made haste to secure 
a portion from the profits of war. The race was swift among those who 
volunteered, to reach the recruiting office before it v. as too late, and the 
whole loyal heart of the country was aglow with enthusiasm and conHdence 
that the first great battle would secure a peace. And inexperienced in war, 
the people and the army were alike impatient for the battle day to come that 
would forever wipe out secession. 

At length it arrived, and on the battle-field of Bull Run the armies met in 
deadly combat, the Hero of Mexico being Commander-in-Chief of tlie Fed- 
eral forces, though not in the field. How much confidence was felt in the 
success of the Federal arms is attested by the fact that hundreds of men, 
and I know not but women, went out to see the rebels routed. 

It may be well here, perhaps, to point out as I see it now, how groundless 
were the hopes of the people. Up to this time it hail not occurred to the 
minds of the masses how much difference there was in the habits of the peo- 
ple, North and South. The people of Secessia hill life so cheaply that 
the poorest Southerner would not allow the lie to be given him without driv- 
ing his bowie-knife to tl'e heart of the offender, or bid him, pistol in hand, to 
take his distance. This had been their training from their youili up. while 
I doubt not but nine-tenths of the men composing the Northern army, had 
never fired a gun or smelt even the sportsman's powder. This difference in 
the habits of the two armies was sufficient in itself to gain to the Rebels the 
battle of July 21st, ISGl. 

It must he borne in mind also, that many composing the Federal army en- 
gaged at the Battle of Bull Run, never realized that they were going to 
fight, for the impression amongst them was that the Southern army would 
surely be routed at the approach of the Union troops. I doubt not but 
many enlisted in the three mouths' regiments who never dreamed of seeing a 
rebel in arms. Do not understand me as casting any reflections upon tbe 
valor of the Northern army. These remarks only apply to the first impres- 
sions and engagements with the enemy. Quick to learn, three years of war 
have taught them how to meet the foe, and their valor will, I doubt not, 
endure until every vestige of Secession and Rebellion finds a grave in the 
" last ditch." 

Let it be remembered also that we had from our inception as a free nation 
been taught the doctrine of non-intervention in war, excepting in self-defence, 
and the people of the North, from these very teachings, were not a military 
class. I confess the South was under the same Government, but while the 



( 6 ) 

Xortb was busy utfcndiiiK' to manuruetnriim- and agricultural interests, the 
leaders of the Relu'llion were ins' ructinu' their people in the art of war — • 
covertly, I admit, i)Coanse the object of these teachinijs were covertly kept 
out of view until the time arrived for the leaders to show their hand. 

All this was done under the treacherous Administration of the " old pub- 
lic functionary," Buchanan, lead by one of his thievinsr Cabinet (Floyd), who 
had stolen all the arms in the country and sent them South before the people 
at the Xorth were ev.u aware that the Go\-ernuient arsenals had been dis- 
turbed. 

Now these things are not kept in view by that class of croakers who, 
claiming to be loyal, cannot see why the (iovernment does not close the war. 
Li short, reflection firms no part of their character, and hence it is that they 
are continually referring" to the declaration of the Secretary of State, that 
the war wou'd be clo.sed in three months — a statement I confess that ought 
never to have been made, ami which never would have been, had the Secre- 
tary known that the machinery of the Rebellion was so complete; that half 
the officers und^r (jruvernmvat were in secret sympathy with it ; that our 
vessels of war at sja were under command of men who on arriving home 
Avould throw off all allegiance to the United States Government, and who, 
had it been practicable, would have given up tiielr shi^js to the Southern 
Confederacy. 

Bat apnrt from the want of appreciation of what we had to contend 
against, the Government had not learned how to conduct a war. For, prod- 
igal of resources, it was thouglit by them aosolute'y necessary that our 
armies should be incumbered with all the paraphernalia that one crossing 
the plains in an Indian country would re(iuire ; in short, they followed their 
Democratic precedent in the war against the Morinans of Utah, and furn- 
ished a regiment with mon> teams than a division for like purposes now 
requires. Not so, however, with the South. 'J'hey, from the very absence 
of means to furnish the.-<e things, went into the campaign of 18f)l more like 
the men of ihe llevnlution, who left the worksh.ip and the plow, that tiiey 
might shoulder their musket and go forth to battle. 

It must be rem nnberwl again, that little over three months had I'lapsed 
from the time the Presid 'nt i.ssued his proclamation for T.o.OOO men, when 
the fatal Battle of Bull Rim was fought and lost. Now when it is kept in 
mind that the tinre (three months) for which th&se men were enlisted, had in 
some ca.ses expired, and was daily expiring, it cannot be claimed that 
McDowell had those advantages which would ensure success. Yet, under all 
the disadvantages that McDowell had to contend with, the Battle of Bull 
Run was vittually won, when the fatal panic amongst citizens first, and sol- 
diers afterwards, took place. The report of the battle by Beauregard is 
proof of this. 

It was after the Battle of Bull Run that the ])eo|)le of the North fully 
realized that we were engaged in an earnest and bloody Rebellion. The 
Oovernment made another call for 300.000 men. Need I repeat here how 
the loyal heart, stung witii defeat, rushed like a tornado to arms, (aster 



( T ) 

than the Government with all its energy could receive and equip them. I 
can well renieuil)er how those who had made so inglorious a retreat, felt a new 
inspiration as they saw the tens of thousands coming forward to aid them in 
the next great struggle. And I cannot resist the conclusion that had 
McDowell again been intrusted with the command of these men, ho would 
have marched them at once to glory. But alas for the country ! The peo- 
ple had declared their verdict, and Scott and McDowell were relieved, the 
one to go into private life, and the other to a sul)ordinate position in the 
great conflict of arms. 

I do not blame the Government or people for seeking a new Commander- 
in-Chief for our armies. The " sear and yellow leaf in life " was upon Gen- 
eral Scott, and he could not be held responsible for our first failure. Yet in 
this, how much was the judgment of the people at fault. It cannot be de- 
nied that the masses of the loyal people looked to the war-worn Hero of 
Mexico, as the one aljove all others to lead or direct our armies to victory, 
until the battle of Bull Run took place. Then everybody discovered that he 
was old and unfitted for so important a position, although six months had 
not elapsed from the date that he was by universal consent, the approved 
commander of our armies, to the time when he was by common consent, al- 
lowed to retire from the stage of action. 

It may be charged that the Government ought to have known whether 
General Scott was incapacitated or not for the responsible duties assigned 
him ; but if I am not mistaken, his rank entitled him to the honor of direct- 
ing all military operations, he being next to the President, Commander-in- 
Chief. But for the argument in the case, let us suppose that the Govern- 
ment had followed their judgment, and discarded the counsels of Gen. Scott, 
or made a subordinate oflicer its military adviser. Would ])ulilic opinion 
have approved their so doing? I am thus particular in asking this question, 
because it has, I think, a bearing on the position taken, that the people have 
erred in judgment as well as the Government. For it is the great fundamen- 
tal, or cardinal principle of Democracy, that power is centered in the people, 
and that their will should in all things be respected. But errors of judgment 
are not to be condemned -as we should condemn those of the heart, therefore 
neither Goverimient or people can be censured for the retention of General 
Scott. But we have now arrived at a point of time in the Rebellion, when 
Government and people are agreed that we need a master mind to direct our 
military operations. 

Now let it be kept in mind that but few of our military men had, at that 
period, made their mark. McClellan, in Western Virginia, had met with 
some successes — at least it was so understood, but as was afterwards fi)und, 
Rosecrans had done the fighting while McClellan had written the dispatch- 
es. This was, perhaps, the school in which he learned to pen the flaming 
telegrams he was afterwards so profuse in, and which clothed his Peninsulr.r 
Campaign with so much importance to himself. Suffice it then to say 
McClellan was by universal consent, appointed by the Government as Com- 
mander-in-Chief of all our forces. Even the churches throughout the land 



(S ) 

discovered in him the Moses who was to lead our armies to future victory, 
and the Throne of Heaven was stormed, if I may be allowed the expression, 
with petitions and thankofferings, that the Almighty had in his mercy, so 
graciously favored the people of the North with " one of His own au- 
nointed." 

I would remark here, that in thus securing the good opinions of the re- 
ligious portion of the community, an element was gained in favor of McClel- 
lan that the Government could not safely oppose, even had they discovered 
that in his elevation to the high and important position of Commander-in- 
Chief, " some one had blundered." 

I will not undertake to say how much policy there was, in this representa- 
tive of Peace-Democracy coming forward and tendering his services to the 
Government. Nor will 1 say how much the Woods, Vallandighams, Coxes, 
Seymours, Pendletons, Pierces, Pughes (and their followers), were de- 
lighted to see a man elevated to this high position whom they could buy for a 
" mess of pottage," and mould to their own form and notions of conducting 
the war ; but I shall endeaver to show that he never disappointed them. 

Before proceeding further, however, with this " Little Napoleon," I must 
beg the indulgence of those in the army who are still claimed as the warm 
friends and admirers of the General, and who it is said, are still in favor ol 
following him as their leader. That he has friends in the rank and file of 
the army, I do not deny. Nor would I claim that his friends at the front do 
not fight the enemy manfully on all and every occasion, when and where they 
can find him ; or that they would wish to do less because McClellan is not in 
command, as I have often heard it claimed by some friends of the General ; 
but that he is the Idol of the Army, as his supporters of the copperhead 
stamp would have the country believe, I do most emphatically deny. Yet I 
admit that there was a time when, had McClellan chosen to have declared 
himself Dictator, and offered terms of reconstruction to suit the rebels, he 
would have commanded a majority of Ihe forces to his support ; but to do 
this, although the heart might be willing the flesh was weak. McClellan 's 
friends and admirers in the army at the present time, are to be found mainhj 
in that class who prefer to spend the time of their enlistment anywhere than 
at the front, or, like their favorite leader, in " organizing " marching and 
counter-marching, preferring rather to lose the enemy than to find him. 

But to return to the time when McClellan first took command of the 
army. It will be remembered that this was iramrdiately after the defeat of 
the Federal arms at Bull Run. I have already alluded to the alacrity with 
which the North responded to the call of the President for 300,000 men ; 
every volunteer mc^iwi fight, and wished to join in the conflict at once. But 
did they have the opportimity to do so ? No, it was proclaimed, that in the 
opinion of our new Commander, the army must be re-organized, drilled and 
go forth ? that to undertake to do anything with men (simply prompted by 
patriotism), who could not fight mechanically, would be a great mistake. 
So for eight long mouths we had 150,000 troops within sight of the Capitol, 
shouldering arms, ordering arms, presenting arms, and passing in review, un- 



( 9 ) , 

til all the fire and ardor that prompted them to enlist in defence of their 
country had burned and consumed itself away. 

Yet who will claim that they discovered in advance of the Government 
that this delay was out of place ? Not the peoi)le. The Copperhead De- 
mocracy, even, found no iault, but the press busied itself in transforming our 
" Little Napoleon " into a great " Anaconda," which was preparing for one 
mighty contraction that would forever crush out Secession and Rebellion. 
The press also asserted with the greatest pertinacity that McClellan under- 
stood " organizing," and would, in his own good time, " move on." Now 
will it be claimed that the people did not approve this delay ? I trust not. 
The people waited McClellan's own good time, in the sublime consciousness 
that " his ways were past finding out " — except by Jefil Davis and his sym- 
pathizers in and around Washington. But the President discovered that 
this delay v:as dangerous, and issued his War Order No. 1. 

Then the cry was raised that the Government was interfering im]iroperly 
with military operations ; that the army was being commanded at Washing" 
ton ; and that this was an injustice to their " pet " General. These state- 
ments were reiterated until McClellan really imagined himself an injured 
man, but at last reluctantly consented to " move." Correspondents slily hint- 
ed that they had seen some ten or twelve wagons marked " McClellan's Head 
Quarters," and that his body guard was " organized." Now allow me to 
ask, how much " organizing " there was, for an active campaign, in the exam- 
jjle of ten or twelve wagons, for the personal comfort of one headijuarters, 
and a body guard of five hundred men. I only refer to this, as I remember 
in his address to the army oji taking the field, he (McCk-llaii) slated that he 
had joined his fortune to theirs — that their fare would be his, and that their 
hard marches would be lor them, for him, and for all. Compare this to the' 
outfits of the rebel Generals, who, on the authority of prisoners of war, never 
have more than a two-horse ambulance during an active campaign. But the 
Rebel Generals meant fight, and independence for the Confederacy, while 
McClellan only desired, as his bosom friend and principal Aid, ('olonel Key, 
unwittingly remarked, " to prolong the war until the next Presidential elec- 
tion, that he might save Slavery: " How hard he lalwred to accomplish this 
purpose ^vill be seen hereafter. 

But our " leader," being ordered again by the President to move on the 
enemy, mounts his body-guard, and accompanied by his hea(l-((uarter train, 
commands the army to move. They proceed to Centreville, where he meets 
fortifications commanding his line of march, with massive engines of death, 
made of — wood.' 1 am aware this is denied liy the General or liis friends, 
but on the same authority, (rebel prisoners,) tlu; enemy did mount ten or 
twelve of these same wooden guns, and left a small force while the main army 
fell back. Nay further, I have been informed by a rebel officer (rather sar- 
castically) that during McClellan's sit-down in front of Yorktown, the 
enemy, discovering his look-out, (or what they supposed to be so,) marched 
and counter-marched one regiment out of and into a piece of woods thirteen 
times, in view of those at the look-out, thus representing by one r^'giment a 



( 10 ) 

force of ten or twelve thousand men. It was such deceptions as these, prac- 
tised on our " Little Napoleon," which led him to telegraph the forces of 
the enemy as " overwhelming." 

But to return, after marching his array to Centcrville and Manassas, our 
hero discovered that he must " change his base." Eight months had already 
been spent in determining a campaign ; so another month is spent in trans- 
ferring his army to the Peninsula. On the authority of the " Committee on 
the Conduct of the War," (see appendix, A,) McClellan landed there with 
a force of 121,500 men, afterwards increased to 159,500. 

The confidence possessed by the soldiers that a few days would find them 
in the rebel Capital, is seen in the fact that in writing to their friends, they 
did not stop to inquire the local name of the 2:»lace of their encampment, but 
wrote so many days' march from Eichraond. And well might tiiey feel con- 
fident of their strength, for the Government gave to McClellan an army in 
numljer and equipment such as a Wellington or genuine Napoleon never 
commanded. But the mysterious delay in front of Yorktown changed the 
buoyant feeling of the men, who began to sicken and die until their numbers 
were more depleted than they would have been by a storming of the enemy's 
works. The cheerful song, " I wish I was in Dixie," was changed for " Home, 
sweet home." 

On the third of May, the rebels having had all the time desired by them 
to fortify more securely the Capital of Treason, withdrew from McClellan 's 
front and from Yorktown, and we then got the assurance that he would 
" push them to the wall." How he carried out this promise may be seen 
from a notice of the Battle of Williamsburg. It will be remembered that 
Hooker had been in Maryland lor seven long months, doing nothing but 
watching the rebels establish blockade batteries on the opposite side of his en- 
campment on the Potomac. Hence it is that we can so well account for the 
impatient manner in which he followed the enemy on their leaving York- 
town, like the hound after his game, until he himself was inside their picket 
lines in front of Williamsburg, even before the foe knew of his approach. 
With what determination he and his noble command engaged the enemy 
from early dawn of the next day, is attested by his losses. And well might 
he go into the battle full of hope that he should be able to capture, or de- 
moralize the enemy, having passed tens of thousands of troops on the same 
errand as himself. Yet for ten long hours Hooker engaged the enemy al- 
most alone. Finding himself hard pressed he sent dispatch after dis])atch for 
reinforcenr'uts, but the Commander-in-Chief could not be found. Still 
Hooker lieKi his own, inspiring his men as he always does by his presence, 
and assuring them that reiiu'brcements were at hand. (See appendix, B.) 

Now where was McClellan on this occasion ? This is a question that has 
never been answered, only in such a manner as to throw a doubt, not only 
on this great " organizer's" military skill, but in view of his previous delays, 
on his loyalty ! What is the reason that McClellan assigns for not being at 
the Ijuttle of Williamsburg? Why, that he was superintending the embarka- 
tion of Franklin's Corps at Yorktown, a duty, as observed i^y some one, that 



( 11 ) 

any good Qiiartennister could have p'}rform:!d better. May Tie wlio knows 
the hearts and secret motives of men, Ibrgive McClellan's sins with as much 
charity as tlie fathers, mothers, wives and friends of those who fell on that 
day, overloiiked this aross nefiiigcnce ol' our hero, committed under his enccmr- 
aging telegrams that he was ' pushing the enemy to the wall!" Then indeed 
will he have mercy shown unto him. 

It would be charitable, perhaps, not to pursue the Battle of Williamslmrg 
Inrther, but I camiot dismiss it without referring to the manner in which he 
gave the Government an account of that battle, and the accounts of it iu 
the public prints. It will be recollected that the newspapers represented him 
a-: arriving on the field at a most important moment ; that his quick percep- 
tion of the s'tuatiitn of thiiius etrablcd him to make a right disposition of 
the forces, and throwing Hancock on the enemy, charged their works and at 
once became master of the fi;'ld. Not a word about Hooker and his brave 
command who had secured for MeClellan a reputation in the eyes of the 
country that our hero himself ought to have earned, but which cowardice or 
something worse prevented him from gaining. His account of the battle^ 
sent to the A\^ar ]) 'partur.'nt, was so manifestly unjust, that he found it 
iiL'cessary to change it, which he afterwards did and gave Hooker and his 
connnand a proper notice. 

That his account of the battle was satisfactory to Ihe pul)lic I doubt not. 
They had not then learn^'d all the facts, but regarded it as the first evidence 
t'lat we should have " no mi>re Bull Runs."' How nmch more might have 
been gained had McO'ellan been on hand to have ordcri'd into action the 
30,000 men who w 're waiting ord.'rs. can never be known. Cei'tain it is, 
that the rebels would have become routed and disorganizi'd to such an exti'ut 
that our march would Iiave been clear to the gates of Richmond, and we be- 
lieve into the city itself. 'I'he rebel prisoners have made this admission to 
the writer hundriMls of times. 

Up to this p Ti.id t!ie writer had bet'n a strong admirer of 'Jen. IMcOlel- 
lau, falling into the same error as the masses, that of praising a man for pro- 
fession without the pi'oof. 1 doubt not but the Government had some mis- 
givings before this, but the popularity of our Commander forbade any action 
against him. 

I shall not notice events that happened during the march from Williams- 
burg to Fair Oaks, only to allude to the discouraging and wasting effect upon 
the troops, caus.'d by his employing the m.en to guard sacredly the property 
of known r.'bels. (See appendix, C.) 

The poor soldier, truduing along under a hot sun, was not allowed a drink 
of cold water at the wells if his presence was obnoxious to some fair lady of 
the chivalric South, whose father, husband, brother, or all of them, were in 
the Oonred<'rate army. The grounds of tho>se rebels were too sacred for the 
tread of the " mudsills of the Xorth," even if they were carrying tlicii- liv(>s 
in their hands to offer them as a sacrifice, if need be, to save tlu'ir country 
from ruin. 

At the battle of Fair Oaks of Mav 'MA, we find McClcllan making the 



( 12 ) 

same mistakes in giving an account of the battle to the Department, charg- 
ing Casey's forces with behaving badly, " from some cause." After investi- 
gation this was discovered to be an unmerited censure, and after finding that 
such charges against good and true men would damage his popularity, he 
contradicted them. Now I venture the assertion, that in no instances since 
the opening of the Rebellion has any other commanding officer found it ne- 
cessary to correct his reports of two such battles as those of Williamsburg 
and Fair Oaks. The inference is plain. McClellan was not present, and 
therefore telegraphed the first reports he could collect. 

It may not be out of place here, perhaps, to allude to a matter that I think 
had a very injurious effect upon the troops and upon the people generally. I 
refer to the nature and influence of the articles that the only paper regularly 
furnished to the army contained, from almost the first day that McClellan 
took command. I do not charge that this officer established a censorship on 
the press, but it is beyond contradiction that the New York Herald was the 
only journal regularly furnished to the soldiers. That its leading articles 
were always reflections upon the Government, and in t'lnov of the " Hero of 
the Chickahominy," is a fact so well known that no quotations from its issues 
are needed in proof of the assertion. Nor can it be denied that its sophistry 
and specious arguments had the desired effect — that of creating an unwar- 
ranted popularity for McClellan. 

The pen, in the hands of so able a man as the editor of the Herald, can do 
an incalculable amount in proselyting the minds of those who are not in the 
habit of criticising its logic. Especially will this be the case when it man- 
ifests a sympathy for those it would convert. Its special pleading in tx?half 
of its favorite General and his army for months was the burden of its song. 

How well the press accomplished the object designed, is seen in the Gen- 
eral's U7iwarrnnted popularity at this time amongst all classes. But thank 
Heaven ! the day commenced to dawn on the minds of the people as McClel- 
lan began to change his base ; and when he issued his addi'css to his army at 
Harrison's Landing, promising the remnant of his 160,000 men that they 
should go into Richmond cost what it might in blood and treasure, the ti-oops 
began to ask what manner of man he was. And it was then that his sun 
commenced gradually to go down, until it set in his removal from the com- 
mand of the army for allowing the enemy to escape after the battle of An- 
tietam. And when he found his own " kith and kin " in the persons of the 
Seymours, Woods, Coxes, Pierces, Vallandighams and Woodwards, his pre- 
vious rcj)utation was, in the eyes of all good men, 

*****" Lost, forever loi5t, 

And nauglit appears but the deep impress of eternal shame, 

That brands the apostate's execrated uame." 

But to return. The two armies are now confronting each other at Fair 
Oaks, where the battle of June 1st was fought, in which Hooker and Kearny 
were mainly engaged, and succeeded in driving the enemy almost in a 
rout, feeling confident that they could have broken his lines and grasped, (to 
them), the coveted i)rize. But our hero of spades and picks had determined 



( 13 ) 

ou another sit-down, that he might Avccp over his reduced ranks and uiukc 
requisitions on the Government that he knew it was out of their power to 
furnish. Now it is quite true that his army -was reduced, and it is tme they 
were discouraged. But from what cause? I will answer, it was because 
they had now lost all hope of doing anything wortliy of themselves and the 
praises of their country. " Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." It was 
not decimated by action for up to this time he had not lost 10,000 men by 
fighting. (See McClellan's report.) It is no inspiration to a man to lay 
his fellow in the cold ground when he has died of camp fever, but let him fall 
by his side in battle, and he feels a renewed energy and something akin to re- 
venge for his brother's blood. 

The Government had now to pass through a trying ordeal, for the press in 
tlie interest of McClellan, seeing that the people were beginning to open 
their eyes, were loud in denunciation of the Government, and in praise of 
their hero and the valor of liis army. Now sympathy, from whatever cause, 
always commends itself to those for whom it is expressed, and hence it is that 
the vail was not fully torn from the eyes of McClellan's troops, and thus it 
was that he got a new lease of their high estimation. But this was of short 
duration. 

On the 2.5th of June Hooker and Kearny again engaged the enemy at 
early morn. During the afternoon our hero arrived on the ground, and ad- 
vancing as near to the front as Hooker's line in the morning, (the nearest he 
ever was during an engagement — nay, it is charged that he never saw a rebel 
line of battle, see appendix, D.,) ordered hostilities to cease, and wrote his 
dispatch from Redimbt No. 3, stating that Hooker and Kearnej" had engaged 
the enemy and accomplished his (McClellan's) purpose. What that pui-pose 
was I presume none ever new but himself ; possibly, however, to show to Lee 
a spot in his line which Hooker and Kearny could pierce unless opposed by 
" overwhelming numbers." 

On the 2Sth of June he commenced to " change his base," having two 
days before caused an order to be read to all the troops, setting forth the 
valor of his friend Fitz John Porter. It will not be necessary to say any- 
thing of this Arnold, a court martial having passed a sentence on him that 
the whole country has approved, for even the Peace-Democracy do not try to 
exhume him from his grave. After the order was given for the army to fall 
back to Harrison's Landing, each man discovered that his personal safety de- 
pended upon his own right arm. It was this that accomplished this masterly 
" change of base " which saved the remnants of this once noble army. But 
the press was so loud in praise of this act on the part of ]\IcClellan that it 
almost appeared like a victory to the masses of the people. 

Not so however did the army look upon it, for they knew M'ell to whom 
the praise belonged. They saw who it was that saved them from destruction; 
that it was the indomitable w^ill of the subordinate Generals, and a deter- 
mined valor of the rank and file, that conducted the retreat to the James 
River, afterwards accredited to McClellan by the copperhead press of the 
North. Only at Malvern Ilill did he see the army (or a portion of it,) until 



{ H ) 

it arrived at Harrison's Laiidii)g, where he had preceded it and Touiid secur- 
ity for himself ou board a gunboat lying in the river. 

Notwithstanding McClellan's conduct during the retreat of the army from 
Fair Oaks, and the fact that he was not within communicating distance of 
the subordinate Generals, we find in his report a minutia of detail, made 
from reports furnished him afterwards by the Generals who fought the bat- 
tles, that would imply not only his presence, but that he was omnipresent. 

Never shall I forget the forloni and hopeless appearance of the troops on 
arriving at their destination. No organization — each one vaguely surmis- 
ing to himself that before the morrow the whole amiy might be surrendered. 
But the quick eye of Heintzelman read these snrmisings, and finding our 
hero in his hiding place told him pointedly that unless he came forward and 
showed himself, he (Heintzelman) would not be responsible for the morale of 
the troops. It was here we got the promise that we " should go into Rich- 
mond, cost what it might in blood and treasure." In McClellan's report of 
his masterly " change of base," he is prodigal in his talk of what he brought 
ofiF safely, but silent about what was destroyed or left for the enemy. 

On the 3d of August, 1862, after a visit of the President aud the new 
Commander-in-Chief, H. W. Halleck, to Harrison's Landing, McClellan re- 
ceived orders to withdraw his forces from the Peninsula, but instead of obey- 
ing them, as was his duty, he chose to enter into a discussion as to the pro- 
priety of complying with the orders, setting forth his views of the effects of 
his doing so, on the army, his strongest argument being the utter demoraliza- 
tion it would produce to again " change his base." Now I venture the asser- 
tion that no order \vas ever issued to troops that was received with more re- 
joicing than this. To leave the Peninsula ! It was Ibod and raiment for 
the well, and a healing balm for the sick, for every man had become fixed iu 
the belief, as if by enchantment, that the Peninsula was covered as with 
one vast Upas tree, to breathe which was sure death. If the friends of 
McClellan will but read the reply of the Commander-in-Chief to this pai'ley- 
ing of their Idol, I think they must, in spite of their perverse natures, be- 
come satisfied of the wisdom of this order. 

On the 14th of August, eleven days after the order was given, INIcClellan 
telegraphed that the movement had connnenced. He had, however, pre- ' 
viously sent off a part of his sick. Now let it be remembered that the op- 
erations of Gen. Pope were for the purpose of enabling McClellan to with- 
draw his army safely. He (Pope) therefore engaged the enemy so fiercely 
that their forces were withdrawn from McClellan's rear, and thus relieved, 
his march to Torktown was uninterrupted. *■ 

How far the delay occasioned by McClellan's parleying about the propri-' 
ety of leaving the Peninsula, and his slow marches after the " movement had 
commenced," caused the defeat of Pope's army, will be clear to all. But af- 
ter he had arrived at Alexandria we find him, according to his own report, 
more concerned about his right to command, and asking cross questions of 
the Department, than he was of precipitating his forces on the enemy, these 
things being of more importance to his vain mind than the defeat of the 



( 15 ) 

rebels. So plainly was it the iatoution of McClellan and Fitz John Porter 
to sacrifice Pope by a want of hearty co-operation, that the President de- 
sired an interview, and " much moved," begged him to use his influence with 
Porter and his (McClellan's) other friends in the Army of the Potomac, and 
induce them to do their duty. Not being able to resist this appeal to his 
vanity he addressed Porter the following letter : 

Washington, September 1st, 1^02. 

I ask of you for my sake, that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, 
that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to 
General Pope, in all the operations going on. The destinies of our country, the hon- 
or of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of 
all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same things to my 
friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of 
them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to General Pope the same 
support they have to me. I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am 
doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary. 

Major-Genekal Porter. Geo. B. McClellan. 

To which Porter sent the following reply : 

Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m., | 
September '2d, ls(i2. ( 

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, 
will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and 
constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded and 
enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty. 

General George B. McClellan, F. J. Porter. 

Major-General commanding Washington. 

The lago-like villainy shown in these letters, in view of Porter's conduct, 
language fails to set forth. How completely their purpose was accomplished, 
that of sacrificing Pope, was shown in the trial of Fitz John Porter (see 
Porter's trial) ; but notwithsanding McClellan's success in driving Pope from 
the Army of the Potomac, and riding once more into full command of that 
army, he soon numbered his own days by his inaction after the battle of An- 
tietam. 

And here let me say, when the true history of this Rebellion is written, 
Pope's character will shine forth with a renewed splendor, while that of his 
enemies will pale as doth the moon before the rising sun, the selected dis- 
patches and telegrams in McClellan's Report notwithstanding. 

Eighteen months had now elapsed, during which the Goverimicnt and peo- 
ple had been deceived by its professed friends. True the President discov- 
ered long before this the character of these men, but dependant upon the 
people for a support of the war, he had to wait until facts had culminated 
against them, and popular sentiment had changed, before he could safely re- 
move them. 

During this time the South, encouraged by her successes, developed every 
means at her command. The latent union sentiment now died out in the be- 
lief that the Federal Government would not be able to re-establish its au- 
thority over the seceded States, and thus compelled by the force of circum- 
stances they identified themselves with the Rebellion. The rebel army, 
flushed with their victory over Pope, did not wait for shoes, bat crossing the 



( 16 ) 

Potomac, invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania. This was bringing the war 
to the very doors of the people of the Xorth, and was the very inspiration 
tieeded to secure the defeat of the rebels at Antietam ; a defeat which, if fol- 
lowed up would have resulted in the capture of the rebel Army of Virginia. 
The victories of the Federal arms of South Mountain and Antietam were 
equal to a reinforcement of 20,000 men. But McClellan " could not see it 
in that light,'' for half the time had scarcely elapsed before alluded to, i. e. 
" prolonging the war until the next Presidential election," and to have closed 
the war then, by crushing the army of Lee, would have secured beyond a 
doubt the re-election of President Lincoln. This was not in the programme of 
the McCllellan party, their aim being to make the war unpopular with the 
North, that they thereby might force a guarantee to the South, from the 
North, that the darling institution of Slavery should not be interfered with, 
but that it should fructify and grow, and spread itself over all our territorial 
possessions. I should be glad to dismiss this ally of the Peace-Democracy, 
but I cannot. 

It will be remembered that during his Peninsular campaign his wants were 
more men. He seems to have discovered that this would no longer take 
with the community in general ; to use a vulgarism, it was " played out," so 
he makes an excuse for not following the enemy after overwhelmingly defeat- 
ing and inflicting on him twice the damage he himself had sustained, that "some 
of his men were without shoes." Now bear in mind that his command was 
composed of his Peninsular forces, in which he had claimed as a reason for 
not desiring to " change his base," the complete organization of his Peninsular 
Army. Not even the want of a shoe or stocking is mentioned ; nay, " most 
of the cases of sickness would soon recover and be ready to take the offen- 
sive," if only allowed to remain in his Paradise at Harrison's Landing. In 
addition to his own forces he had those of Pope, McDowell and Burnside, 
and I have never heard it claimed that these men were in the habit of march- 
ing their commands barefoot. But our hero knew well that with the Poto- 
mac in the rear of the enemy it would not do to be in a hurry. As before 
observed, to break up Lee's army would end the war, which formed no part 
of his plan ; for the Union Party had not yet seen fit to use his name as a 
candidate for Presidential honors, and as this, doubtless, by this time, had been 
his promised reward by the Democracy for doing his share towards prolong- 
ing the war until the next Presidential election, he concluded it best to allow 
Lee to escape, and assign as a reason for so doing that he was waiting the 
arrival of a lew cases of shoes and stockings. As well might every com- 
mander of a company claim the right for his men to remain in camp, for at 
no time can he say that his command of one hundred men do not stand in 
need of something. 

That this has not been the plan of the Confederate commanders, is shown 
by the shoeless, stockinglcss, and ragged condition of their prisoners. Again 
let me remark that nothing produces sickness, and destroys the morale of an 
army equal to inaction, and all the supplies possessed by Government will 
not inspire them to follow an enemy equal to one victory. 



( 17 ) 



But let us review the condition of thinjrs, taking our data from McClel- 
lan's own report. I find he sets the num))er of the enemy op})osing him at 
97,445, and his own forces at 87,164 engaged in action. The loss inflicted 
on the enemy in the battle of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap and Antie- 
tam is set down at 30,000, thus reducing their number to 67,44.5, while his 
own loss in these several battles was 15,220, including reconnoisanccs after 
the battle, making the Federal forces after these engagements, 71 ,944, or 
4,500 more than the enemy had. Now if a force 10,000 less can inflict on 
the enemy a loss of 30,000, and only sustain a loss of fifteen thousand, what 
would a force superior to that of the enemy by 4,500 men be able to do ? 
— especially when we consider that the enemy were weakened by the demor- 
alization that defeat produces, while our own forces were under the inspira- 
tion of a great victory. But again, in addition to a victorious army, where- 
with to follow a defeated army, McOlellan had, after the battle of Antietam, 
30,000 men, including Porter's command and reinforcements received, that 
had not fired a gun in the previous battles. Under these circumstances is it 
not reasonable to suppose that Lee's army could have been captured or driv- 
en into the Potomac ? I only refer to this to show the worshipers of 
McClellan the difficulty of their hero's riding two horses at the same time. 
Desirous of making the most for himself, he has unwittingly committed him- 
self to this position, by showing in his report that he won a great battle at 
Antietam, and then assigning as a reason for not following it up that his 
army could not move for want of shoes, for surely his troops, flush with vic- 
tory, were in as good condition to follow the enemy as they were to retire 
from the field. 

The President having become convinced that his action would be support- 
ed by the people, they being now " weaned from their first love " by this last 
act of McClellan, issued the order removing him from the conmiand of the 
army. It would therefore be invidious to prolong these remarks on McClel- 
lan to a greater length, and I shall therefore leave him after a few general 
remarks, trusting that his fate — that of a lost reputation — will be a warn- 
ing to all those whose vanity exceeds their patriotism. 

That INIcClellan possesses military skill few can doubt, but he lacks all 
those elements which charactei-ize a successful leader ; vain beyond meas- 
ure, no ability to grapple with difficulties, no confidence in himself, no 
courage, no boldness or dash, but a theorist in the strongest sense. His 
greatest battle was fought after he was relieved from the command of the 
army, — a battle in which he cut the rebel army in twain an 1 defeated 
them by detail, but unfortunately for the country they knew nothing of 
it until it appeared in his own report. Again, he writes the President 
wlile on the Peninsula, during his (McClellan's) most laborious moments, 
that he should be glad to telagraph or write his views on the state of the 
country, and our whole field of military operations. This elaborate re- 
view he makes one of the most readable portions of his report. It is this 
theoretical warfare and selcrteil telegrams that have been thrown on the mar- 
ket to proselyte the people in favor of this candidate for Presidential honors. 



( 1« ) 

But to return to tlie army which was now under the conmiand of" the 
noble Burnside. I shall not attempt a defence of this General's military 
qualifications. I am not sure but the unfortunate result of the battle 
of Fredericksburg may be fairly chargeable to the country. It will be 
remembered that the people had grown restive under the inaction of the 
army, and as its previous commander had been removed from this very 
cause, it was not unreasonable to suppose that his successor's aim would 
be to appease this desire op the people for action, by fighting a battle. 
How far he had the hearty co-operation of all the General Officers, will 
be matter for the future historian of the rebellion. Certain it is, that 
when the copperhead press would have thrown the responsibility of the 
battle and its unfortunate results on the Government, he came forward and 
nobly defended the Administration against the croakings of these same 
coj)perheads. But again, one thing is certain : the so-called Confederate 
Government, learning that a fighting General now commanded the army, 
used every means in its power to reinforce the army of Lee by the use of 
one of the most merciless conscriptions ever known — a conscription that 
stops not to ask if an aged mother or father is dependant for support on 
an only son — a conscription that stops not to find out on whom the lot 
falls, as in the draft at the Korth, but one that forces every man capable 
of bearing arms into the rebel ranks, unless he is the fortunate owner of a 
certain number of slaves. Yet we hear no murmurings from the copper- 
heads of the iSJorth, on the arbitrary assumption of power exercised by 
the so-called Confederate Government. But praises are sung over the 
unanimity of sentiment of the press and people of the South, by the very 
class of politicians at the ^orth who are doing all they can to prevent 
concert of action on the part of our people. It was this high handed 
exercise of power that gave to Lee an army for the first time "over- 
whelming." 

The writer has had unusual facilities for learning from rebel prisoners 
the status of their armies, and the opinion as expressed to the writer has 
invariably been, that every man capable of bearing arms was, on ]\lcClel- 
lan's removal from command, forced into the Confederate service. 

I may be reminded by those who are still disposed to follow a theoreti- 
cal warrior, as I olten have, that he went nearer to Richmond than any of 
bis successors have yet been. To this I would reply, that McClellan nev- 
er had to contend with a tithe of the opposition his successors have had to 
contend with in defences. Jeff. Davis knows too well that once let the 
army of Lee be destroyed, and the Confederacy is gone. To prevent this 
the army of Northern Virginia has been strengthened with the best fight- 
ing material of the So ith. It is the withdrawing of these men from other 
defensive positions, that has enabled Sherman to march through the entire 
South-west, and drive the rebel force to the very brink of the last ditch. 
.Nay, it is the concentration of the rebel forces in Virginia that has re- 
deemed jMissouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee. In short, only 
defeat the army of Lee and the Eebellion is crushed. This is my answer 



( 19 ) 

to all who tauntingly proclaim that INIcClelian got nearer to Richmond 
than any of his successors have yet i!one. 

But the loyal people of the North can take this cheering reflection to 
their hearts, that Burnside, Hooker, .Meade and tlie noble (Irant, linve 
done all tbat patriotism and love of country could ins])ire. To the army 
nothing need be said in favor of these Generals, for they knovv how nobly 
they have acted on the field of battle — they are wedded together by too 
many hard scenes to allow such reflections on their Commanders to influ- 
ence them. Never did the army feel more confident than now of ultimate 
success, and never was there a time when less nuu-mui'ing was lu'ard 
among the troops. Yet a month's service in the present campaign is nuire 
than eqiial to all the Peninsular Campaign put together. And why is it 
that no complaints come from men sufi'ering so nuicii T It is because they 
see their commanding Generals leading them on the field of battle for the 
express purpose of crushing, and not prolonging the Kebellion. It is use- 
less to suppose that tirades against the Government, or cries of •' peace, 
peace, when there is no peace," will influence the army. Each man has 
learned the art of war to such perfection, that he can discriminate between 
one who fights to put down Rebellion, and those who are made heroes by 
newspapers for political ends. A man who would go and preach peace, 
other than the peace made by the rifle and the sword, would not find a 
corporal's guard to listen to him amongst the men in the trenches. 

No, thank God ! the noble armies of Grant and Sherman are not to be 
cajoled by the everlasting cry of " peace " into laying down their arms to 
the South, and ceasing to battle for a restored Union — a Union that the 
nations of the earth will honor; a Union that, through the Providence of 
God, will be without the disturbing elements that have provoked this Re- 
bellion. 



APPENDIX 



FROM SWORN TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE " COMMITTEE ON THE 
CONDUCT OF THE WAR." 



(A) JonN Tucker sworn and examined. 

Q. What is your position under tlie government? 

A. I am Assistant Secretary of War. 

Q. Do you know anything about the transportation of troops to our army at York- 
town and the peninsula ? 

A. I do ; I attended to tlie embarking of those troops. 

Q. Can you state wluit number of troops were first embarked for that place ? 

A. Prior to the .'ith of April, as I know from the statements made to me Ijy the 
quartermasters who were attending to the details, there were 121, ,500 men. 

Q. That was before General Franklin's division was ordered there ? 

A. Yes, sir. Shortly alter that Franklin's division was shipped ; it numbered 
12,000 men. About the first of June McCall's division was sent down ; it consisted 
of 10,000 men ; and about the same time from Ijaltimore and Fortress Monroe, there 
were sent 11,000 men. Tlit^ last of .June a part of Shields's division were sliipped. 
I did not superintend that, luit 1 am informed that there were about .5,000 of them. 

Q. You superintended the shipuaeut of all the troops but those from Shields'a 
division ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Does tliat c(niiprise all that has been sent to General McClellan since he landed 
there? 

A. That is all that I know of. 

Q. That includes tlie number sent by Generals AVool and Dix ? 

A. Yes sir. That makes 159,500 men in all. 

Q. Do you know of any other forces at the disposal of the government that could 
have beeu spaied for his assistance ? 

A. I do not. 

Q. Were there reasons why General McDowell's force could not be sent ? 

A. Yes, sir. The President deemed them essential for the protection of Wash- 
ington. 

Q. And the force was none too strong for the defence of that place ? 

A. It was so regarded. 

(B) ^Injor General JosErn Hooker sworn and examined. 

y. To what do you attribute the failure of t!ie pennisular campaign ? 

A. I do not hesitate to say that it is to be attriljuled to the want of generalship 
on the i)art of our commander. 

Q. Were you consulted upon the subject of the line of the peninsula in preference 
to the one direct to Kichnmnd ? 

A. 1 never was consulted on the subject. 

Q. What was the conditiim of things at Yorktown when our troops first landed 
on the peninsula, as regards the strength of the place and the relative sti-ength of 
the opjjosing forces? 

A. * * At the time that General Mi'Clellan lauded with this large army there 
were somewhere between 8,000 and 15,000 at Yorktown. I have heard it estimated 
as low as 8,000 and as high as 15,000. 

Q. What course would you have advised at the time of the landing on the pe- 
ninsida under the ciruunistances '! 

A. What I subsequently did will, I think, convey an answer to that question. I 



( 21 ) 



attacked, with my ^single divi-^ion, a line of work^ at Williamsburg stronsjer than the 
line across the Peninsula at Yorktmvn. At Yorktown, long after I jomed, 1 never 
could understand why I was required to send one-half of my number on duty, day 
and night, to dig, so as to invest that place. I could only conclude that a seige had 
been determined upon somewhere in tiie programme before ever having felt to see 
whether we had an enemy in front or not. And a great many others felt so too. 
Prom my examination of tlic works at Yorktown, and reaching away beyond the po- 
sition that 1 occupied, I felt that their lines could be pierced without any considera- 
ble loss by the corps with which I was on duty — Heiutzelman's corps. We could 
have gone right through, and gone to the rear of the enemy. They would run the 
moment we got to the rear, ami we could have picked up the prisoners. Right there 
at Yorktown the enemy had expended a great deal of labor. But I would liave 
marched right through the redoubts, which were a part of the cordon they liad, and 
got on the road between Y(nktown and RiclmKunl, and thus compelled the enemy to 
tight me on my ground, and not have fuught tlicm on theirs. 

Q. Sui)iJose that General McCleUan hud thrown his army between Yorktown and 
Williamsburg with as much rapidity as he could, what would have, probably been 
the ettect ? 

A. It would have ended in the cajituri! and destruction of the enemy's armj'. 

Q. Do you know any reason why that could not have been done ? 

A. I do not. 

Q. You were there when the enemy retreated from Yorktown ? 

A. I was within a mile and a iialf (if there. 

Q. Will you state, briefly and succintly, what took place upon their retreat? 

A. The troops ordered out in the first instance to pursue them were some dra- 
goons and some light batteries under General Stoneman. I received orders to s\ip- 
port General Stoneman, and left my camp between one and two o'clock in the after- 
uoon for that purpose. * * * As early as nine o'clock in the [next] ilay my 
skirmishers had advanced so near Fort Magruder, and there held then- position, that 
they could not work their artillery. If a man showed his hand or head above the 
work he got a l)all in it. Wiieu this was done F sent word to the connnaudiug offii'er 
on the Yorktiiwn road that there was nothing to prevent his advancing his troops 
and taking position along side of mine. Tiie place to wliere I sent was about a 
mile and iialf from me. t supposed then that General Heintzelman was there, but 
it turned out that he had lelt, and (leneral Sumner was in command with a large 
force, certainly not less than H(),()00 men. He could have advanced through the line 
of defences across the peiunsula, at Williamsburg, without losing ten men. The 
enemy could not lire, for 1 had him in a vice. I wanted him to advance, and until 
three o'clock of that day I expected he would adv.ince and march through the line 
held by the enemy, and go to jiicking up |)risoners. During this time my own 
tri>ops were engaged witli not less tlian three or four times my number, (ieiu'ral 
Kearny, who was the last ot all tlie aiiny to leave Yorktown — except Porter's di- 
vision, left to garrison Yorktown — was the first to come to my assistanrp. If 
General Sumner had advanced the reliellion woidd have been bm-ied there. He did 
not advance at all. 

Q. Where was (Jeneral McCleUan during all this time? 

A. At Yorktown. About 9 o'clock, or thereabouts, of the morning of the fight, 
Prince de Joinville, seeing that no reinforcements would be sent to me, started for 
Yorktown, and reached there in about an hour. * * I tliink (Jovernor Sprague 
went down also to urge General Mi^Cleilau to come up. It was rejjortcd to me that 
General McCJlellan left Yorktown between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoim. Lieut. 
Col. Webb, now the inspector of the fifth corps, was present at the interview be- 
tween Prince de Joinville and General McCleUan. General McCleUan showed a 
great indisposition to go forward, and only left, as I am told, between tour and five 
o'clock. 

Q. You stood your ground ? 

A. Yes sir. I had a very severe fight, and lost 1.700 men. In consequence of 
the condition of the roads I could not get up my ammunition. And my men stood 
their ground with the bayonet and with such aunuuuition as they riudd collect from 
the cartridge boxes of those who had fallen. 1 think that was the hardest fight that 
has been made this war. 

Q. The enemy evacuated during tlie night? 

^_ * * * During the night the en(>my evacuated Williamsburg. I have since 
learned, from most reliable sources, that when the news of the battle reached Rich- 
mond, Jefferson Davis and Governor Letcher moved their families out of Richnuind, 
removed tlie archie ves and tlieir libraries ; and everv citizen who couhl cmnmand a 
vehicle liad his goods piled on wagons, and prepared to abandon the city. They 
only retm-ned — those who had left — when they found that the pursuit ceased. I 
might almost say was abandoned. 

Q. Is it your judgment that you could have gone into Richmond then ? 



( 22 ) 



A. I think we conld have moved right on, and jrot into Richmond b}' the second 
day after tlie battle without another gun being fired. 

Q. What was done ? 

A. We moved on in a manner T never did understand, losing time. If there was 
any necessity for that i never have yet appreciated it. So far as tlie best informa- 
tion we have goes, the enerny had abandoned the idea of defending Riclmiond. And 
it was only when they saw the lassitude and inefficiency of oiu' army that they con- 
cluded to make a stand there. 

(C) Colonel Oilman Makston sworn and examined. 
Q. What is your rank and position in tlie arnij'? 

A. I am colonel of the 2d regiment New Hampshire volunteers, in tlie first bri- 
gade of Hooker's division. 

Q. How long have you been in the service ? 

A. Since May, 18(51. 

Q. You were in the battle of Bull Run 1 

A. I was; I received a wound there; liad my right arm broken, and was disa- 
bled until October ; indeed I did not resume the command of my regiment until 
later, in November. 

Q. Were you among the first troops that went down to Yorktown and the pe- 
ninsula last spring? 

A. I was with the first, not the very first ; we went down from Bndd's Ferry. 
* * * * * * * ■ 

Q. What is the practice on the peninsula in regard to taking care of rebel jirop- 
erty ; have you had anything to do with that matter there '! 

A. We have had a great deal to do with it. The i)ractice has been to place 
guards over the houses, barns, corn-cribs, gardens, and even, in some instances, the 
rail fences, of all the peojile pretty much on the route of the army. 

Q. Is that done where the people are known to be rebels ? 

A. It has been done where they were known to be rebels. A detachment from 
ray own regiment has been ordered to stand guard for 24 hours over a rail fence 
which it was well understood belonged to a man who with his sons was then in the 
rebel army. That was at a place called Baltimore Cross Roads. 

Q. What effect doe.-:, that hnve upon our volunteer troops? 

A. It annoys them and disheartens them more than any otlier one thing I can 
mention. 

Q. Is it necessary that that should be done to preserve discipline among tlie 
troops, and be enabled to control them? 

A. That has sometimes been given as a reason for the practice. But in my opin- 
ion it was not necessary to be carried to anything like the extent that it has been 
in order to preserve disci|)line ; and 1 will state further that we have not been al- 
lowed to take forage, hay, corn, oats, or anything of that kind, from the barns and 
cribs of the inhaljitants who had abandoned their property and were then in the 
service of the rebels, while our staff and team horses were nearly in a starving con- 
dition. This has occurred in many instances, to my own personal knowledge. 

Q. What has been the practice of the quartermaster and (■(unmissary depart- 
ments in regard to taking such property for the use of the army, they being sup- 
posed to be the proper persons to do it? 

A. Since the army landed at Yorktown T have no knowledge of their being al- 
lowed to take any such property. 

Q. Do you know any instance where this kind of treatment of rebels has made 
friends of them ? 

A. No, sir, I do not. On the contrary I know many instances, or a number of 
instances, in which it has had no such effect, to my certain knowledge. At Williams- 
burg, where there were veiy few union people, very few indeed — I did not hear of 
but five in the two weeks 1 was there — the universiil testimony of the inhabitants 
wa-s that we had protected their property, preserved better order than their own 
army had when it was in possession of the town. They made no complaint so far 
as 1 know ; at any rate I never heai'd of but one complaint in a residence of two 
weeks there, of any dei)redrttioii by any soldier on any person's projiorty whatever, 
and that was a very slight matter, the t;ikiiig of a horse or mule, a mule I tiiink, for 
some purpose of transportation, liy autlioi'ity of the Provost Marshal. And yet ev- 
ery one of those peo|)le, with the exception of three or four who were regarded as 
Union people, declared in the most positive manner that they never would consent 
to a union with the north, or a reconstruction of the Union on any terms whatever. 

(D) Major General E. V. Sumner sworn and examined. 
******* 

A. The action at Malvern Hill commenced on the left, about 10 o'clock in the 
morning. General McClellan had deemed it necessary to go down to Harrison's 
I^andinff to determine on the point to whi'-h the troops were to retire. T therefore 
fou.id myselt, by vnxue of my senioruy oi' rank, in coiuniand oi iac army, without 



( 23 ) 



having been iuvesteJ formally with that comnuuid, or having received any instruct- 
tions in relation to it. I received a note from General Marcy, General McClellan's 
chief of staff, to this effect — that any orders I gave on the field wonld be approved. 
About an hour or two afterwards I received a verbal message from General McClel- 
lan, by Col. Key. The general was then down the river at Haxall's. 

Q. How far was that from where the battle was going on ? 

A. Prom two and a half to three miles. That message was to this effect : that 
the general had reason to believe that an attack was to be made on Hooker, who 
was in the centre, and asking me to take measures to re-enforce him. I asked Col. 
Key if General McClellan had told him how I was to re-enforce General Hooker ; 
inasmuch as I had not had the previous disposition of the troops, I was at a loss to 
know what portion of the line General McClellan would have weakened. Col. Key 
replied that General McClellan did not say how it was to be done, but he wished me 
to do it. * * * * * * 

Q. How far was Harrison's Landing from the battle-field ? 

A. Al)out seven miles. The retreat was accomplished, and we reached Harri- 
son's Landing about eleven o'clock the next day. The troops all halted as they 
came upon the jjlateau near the river, and remained there until the day after. The 
mud was actually ankle deep all over the ground. I did not see General McClellan 
that day at all. I did not see him from the time he left me on the field at Malvern 
nntil the day after we reached Harrison's Landing. 

Q. Where was he during your second fight at Malvern? 

A. I do not know. I presume he was at his quarters. I do not know of his be- 
ing on the field. ***** 

Q. How came you to abandon Malvern Hill the first time, seeing that you were 
victorious in both battles there? 

A. That is a question I cannot answer. I do not know. I should have been 
verj' strongly in favor of holding it if my opinion had been asked about it, and I was 
particularly desirous that the general should hold it after he had retaken it in Au- 
gust, because that was resuming the offensive again, after lying so long as we had 
basking in the sun at Harrison's Landing. * * * 

Q. During the peninsular campaign, and all those fights there, was the command- 
ing general ever with you on the field in an actual engagement ? 

A. He was not with me in any action there. * * * 



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